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A RBITRATION: TIME LIMITS AND 
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS 
Richard L Bloch* 
Time limits in a collective bargaining agreement,1 particularly as 
they apply to the grievance procedure, are very important. Filing or 
processing deadlines are taken as seriously in the context of these 
private documents and negotiated time limits as they are in the 
world of standard litigation, with deadlines that are imposed statu­
torily or otherwise. Management advocates often view the time 
limitation provisions as virtually the only thing employers gain, as 
opposed to give, in the bargaining relationship. Deadlines have 
been strictly, if reluctantly, construed by most arbitrators.2 
The "continuing violation" provides a meaningful exception to 
the otherwise immutable time bar. As the violation continues, so 
* A.B. 1965, Dartmouth; J.D. 1968, M.B.A. 1974, University of Michigan. Mr. Bloch is a 
labor arbitrator in Washington, D.C. - Ed. 
1. The labor agreement normally controls the scope and nature of items that may be 
submitted to the dispute resolution process, often ending in binding arbitration. A standard 
clause dealing with time limitations might read as follows: 
A grievance protesting an alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement 
must be filed within ten days of the time the grievant knew, or should have known, of 
the event giving rise to the grievance. Failure to file the grievance in a timely manner 
will result in its being considered void. 
There are cases in which arbitrators have simply ignored time limits, somehow concluding 
that a ruling on the merits would benefit the parties, see Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Airline 
Pilots Assn. Intl., 37 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 741 (1961) (Wolff, Arb.), but these cases are 
thankfully rare. To be sure, there are cases where the jurisdictional issue is so knotty, arcane 
and time consuming, and the central claims in the case are so straightforward and, signifi· 
cantly, without merit (one cannot grieve a grievance that is untimely) that the arbitration 
may properly bypass the procedural issue as a measure of judicial economy. It should be 
recalled, however, that parties may well have agreed to avoid bifurcating the case - arguing 
procedure first and merits at a later date - as an economy gesture of their own, with no 
thought that they would, by so doing, forego a threshold decision on arbitrability. 
2. In Painesville Township Local Schools v. Ohio Assn. of Public School Employees Local 
324, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 333, 336-37 (1997) (Oberdank, Arb.), the arbitrator stated 
the majority view: 
Arbitrators are reluctant to dismiss disputes on procedural grounds but, as I have said in 
the past, time limits are a fact of life in industrial relations and strengthen the bargaining 
relationship between the parties by encouraging disputes to be brought fonvard when 
they occur and processed in an expeditious fashion. They add finality to the collective 
bargaining process by ensuring that the parties will not have to waste time or financial 
resources on stale claims. As much as the arbitrator may want to decide issues on the 
merits, he must refrain from doing so when the dispute is not timely. 
On the other hand, arbitrators will resolve doubts against forfeiture of the right to process 
grievances when the labor agreement raises doubts as to the impact of the time limits or 
when the evidence shows, for example, a practice of lax enforcement. See City of Wooster v. 
Wooster Employees Assn., 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 230, 233-34 (1997) (Shanker, Arb.). 
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does the window of opportunity to protest it. The most important 
element in recognizing a new violation is the fact that the arbitrator 
will not consider the failure to grieve prior breaches fatal to the 
claim of one protesting the current actions. But defining what the 
continuing violation does is easier than understanding what it is. It 
is apparent that the term itself - "continuing violation" - is both 
a misnomer and a source of some confusion among the parties and 
in the minds of arbitrators as well, and that leads, on occasion, to 
conceptual dilemmas and errant results. The purpose of this discus­
sion is to highlight the true nature of this very important concept. 
An excellent, if divided, view of the continuing violation land­
scape, in a nonarbitration context, is provided in United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Evans.3 A flight attendant hired by United Airlines in 1966 
was required to resign in 1968 because she married, breaching the 
company's no-marriage rule. The rule was subsequently found to 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.4 In 1972, Ms. Evans was 
rehired, but as a new employee. She filed suit under Title VII, 
claiming the employer violated the statute by refusing to credit her 
with seniority for any period prior to February of 1972. She as­
serted that, by denying her seniority back to the starting date of her 
original employment, United was perpetuating the effect of past 
discrimination. The District Court dismissed her complaint. That 
her resignation was a result of an unlawful employment practice 
was irrelevant, in the court's judgment, because she had forfeited 
her opportunity to address her grievance when she failed to file a 
charge within ninety days of the date of her separation.5 The Sev­
enth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately reversed that decision.6 
The Supreme Court agreed with the District Court that her 
claim for seniority was untimely. The Court acknowledged that the 
seniority system did give present effect to a past act of discrimina­
tion: "United's seniority system does indeed have a continuing im­
pact on her pay and fringe benefits."7 But, it said, 
the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical 
question is whether any present violation exists. She has not alleged 
3. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
4. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). 
5. See Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 287 (N.D. ill. 
1975), available in 1975 WL 11902. 
6. See Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976). A divided panel of 
the court first affirmed the district court decision, Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 12 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 288 (7th Cir. 1976), available in 1976 WL 3803, then after the 
Supreme Court decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), 
reheard the case and unanimously reversed, see 534 F.2d at 1248. 
7. United Air Lines, 431 U.S. at 558. 
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that the system discriminates against former female employees or that 
it treats former employees who are discharged for a discriminatory 
reason any differently from former employees who resigned or were 
discharged for a non-discriminatory reason. In short, the system is 
neutral in its operation.8 
In that case, then, the mere fact that a past, admittedly illegal, event 
had affected the calculation of seniority credit did not justify the 
:finding of a continuing violation. Because the earlier act had not 
been challenged in a timely fashion, it maintained no present legal 
significance. "A contrary view," said the Court, "would substitute a 
claim for seniority credit for almost every claim which is barred by 
limitations. "9 
Justice Marshall's dissent voiced the mantra that so often leads 
to error: "In the instant case, the violation -treating respondent 
as a new employee even though she was wrongfully forced to resign 
-is continuing to this day."10 This is an example, however, of im­
properly mixing a repetition of the offending act with the continua­
tion of the effects of the acts. It is a distinction often overlooked. 
In the arbitration arena, substantial confusion exists as to when 
a violation "continues. "11 In part, for reasons to be discussed, the 
misunderstandings flow from the terminology itself -and in part 
from the existence of multiple events and an inability to distinguish 
between the act, which is grievable, and its effects, which are not. 
The inability of arbitrators to understand this distinction causes un­
certainty as to proper application of the continuing violation doc­
trine. As will be noted, the search for "continuity" can result in a 
wild goose chase. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the vital­
ity of a grievance depends not on the continuing aspect of the al­
leged violation, nor even on its chrome or recurrent nature, but on 
the fact that it is a new act. In terms of timeliness considerations, 
any relationship to earlier occurrences is likely to be irrelevant. 
8. 431 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted). 
9. 431 U.S. at 560. 
10. 431 U.S. at 561-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
11. Parties have even argued a "continuing grievance" theory under the rubric of a con­
tinuing violation: Once filed, the argument is posed, a grievance should remain viable for the 
purpose of protesting similar actions taken at a later time. See Kroger Co. v. UFCW Local 
455, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 466, 469-70 (1997) (Baroni, Arb.). In that case, the arbitrator 
properly rejected the union's assertion that a grievant passed over for a position could use 
her grievance in that case to protest a later bypass, because of "continued mistreatment." 
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THE "CLASSIC" CASES 
The issue can be better understood by examining hypothetical 
extremes.12 Consider first the case of an employer who, for pay pur­
poses, accidentally assigns an employee a lower rate than is properly 
paid for his job classification. Thereafter, each pay period, the em­
ployee's pay is shorted by ten dollars. Assume further that the collec­
tive bargaining agreement provides ten calendar days within which 
one must grieve. The grievant does not immediately catch the error, 
and thus the grievance is filed after several pay periods have elapsed, 
thirty days after the first erroneous paycheck. This type of case is 
often cited by arbitrators as a classic example of a continuing viola­
tion.13 According to the rationale, each pay period the employee 
has suffered another contractual deprivation and therefore ought to 
be able to grieve, even beyond the original contractual ten-day 
deadline. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the individual who is dis­
charged. Assume an employee is discharged for misconduct on June 
15th. The labor agreement provides a ten-day period within which to 
grieve. However, a grievance is not filed until September 15th. As in 
the case above, this person argues that the loss of pay each pay 
period amounts to a continuing violation. This, however, is the 
"classic" example of a case where the violation does not continue. 
Few would argue that the September grievance protesting the dis­
missal was somehow exempt from timely filing and that it could be 
entered into the grievance procedure then or thereafter without 
limits. That result would be entirely contrary to the reasons for the 
limits in the first place. In this context, the lost paychecks represent 
the continuing impact of the act, but do not, in and of themselves, 
give rise to new violations or additional filing deadlines. Thus, the 
conclusion that the discharged employee is out of time, and out of 
luck in terms of filing, is easily understood. To be sure, the grievant 
fails to receive a paycheck each and every week. But this is the 
result of a single act - discharge - that was fully implemented and 
completed some time ago. While the effects of the violation, if it 
was one, continue to be felt, the original act cannot now be con-
12. Throughout this discussion, hypotheticals (as distinguished from cases) will be set 
forth in italics. 
13. See, e.g., USS v. United Steelworkers of America Local 1219, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 434 (1997) (Bethel, Arb.); Harding Galesburg Mk.ts., Inc. v. UFCW Local 951, 103 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1158 (1994) (Daniel, Arb.); Titan Wheel Intl. v. International Assn. of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local 2048, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 514 (1991) (Smith, 
Arb.). 
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tested, and the lack of a paycheck does not represent a present 
violation. 
However, these classic examples, and others, deserve closer 
scrutiny. In the first case, for example, it is true that an individual 
deprived, week after week, of the appropriate pay stipend has a 
grievance. Yet, the ability to grieve the violation rests not on the 
fact that it has continued, as observed above, but rather on the fact 
that it is new. The shorted paycheck in any given week stands as a 
new and independent violation. The employee's ability to enter the 
grievance procedure in a timely fashion has nothing to do with past 
breaches. Nonetheless, depending on the arbitrator's assessment of 
whether the grievant sat on his rights too long, there may be ques­
tions as to the grievant's ability to collect retroactively.14 
Moreover - and here is the real heresy - were it not for the 
accidental nature of the pay shortage in the above-cited "classic" 
14. Indeed, there conceivably may be a case where a union's acquiescence in a policy 
requires a finding not that the complaint is necessarily untimely, but that it fails because the 
policy is now accepted through laches on the part of the union. Generally, care must be 
taken to distinguish issues of arbitrability from those of remedy and retroactivity. Finding 
that a grievance is arbitrable, due to a recurrent violation, does not require the conclusion 
that the grievant is entitled to back pay to the beginning of the violations. Consistent with 
the notion that the claim is based on a new act so, too, should the remedy be restricted to that 
act. 
In Harding Galesburg Markets, the arbitrator considered the case of an employer who 
had failed to implement the terms of a settlement agreement that would have affected several 
employees' wages. There, too, the grievance had been filed outside the existing time limits. 
Said the arbitrator: 
The contract does, indeed, establish certain restrictions on the filing of grievances but 
this particular complaint has the unique aspect of a wage claim which is universally 
treated by arbitrators quite differently from ordinary contract disputes. The reason is 
that each time an employee receives a paycheck which is less than what is believed to be 
the proper amount there is created a right to complain and grieve. If the employee, for 
whatever reason, fails to take action within the specified period of time, the right to 
complain about that alleged shortage is lost and cannot subsequently be raised. How­
ever, each new paycheck constitutes a new opportunity for complaint - it is then a case 
of continuing violation and the right to grieve is reactivated regularly as paychecks are 
received. Normally, arbitrators would not permit such a grievance to reach back any 
further than the immediate paycheck which falls within the filing period. However, this 
contract provides that in such an event the back pay liability may extend retroactively to 
as much as ninety days prior to the event complained of. In fact, the parties here by 
having established such a ninety day period of retroactivity clearly intend such cases to 
be an exception to the normal filing period time limitations. For the reasons noted 
above the arbitrator finds that this grievance is timely filed and subject to arbitration 
though the remedy by way of any back pay would be limited by the contract provision. 
Harding Galesburg Mkts., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. {BNA) at 1163. This case and the discussion 
cited above highlight the true nature of a continuing violation. The arbitrator focused on the 
recurring paychecks as new and independent actions that were, because of their repetition, 
subject to a grievance. Significantly, it was not the loss occasioned by the initial action that 
supported the finding of a continuing violation. Indeed, the arbitrator noted that "[i]f the 
employee, for whatever reason, fails to take action within the specified period of time, the 
right to complain about that alleged shortage is lost and cannot subsequently be raised." 103 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1163. Rather, it was the series of new paychecks, each raising a 
new shortage issue, that justified the finding of a continuing violation. 
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case, this might not be considered a continuing violation at all. The 
relevance of the inadvertent deduction is that the grievant may not 
have been on notice of the violation until he became aware of the 
offending paycheck. But had management formally changed a pol­
icy, giving clear notice of its intent to adjust the pay structures, the 
existence of a series of diminished checks at a later date should be 
irrelevant.15 The "paycheck-as-violation" approach is common­
place and, for reasons to be discussed below, often erroneous. 
Again, the error is in failing to distinguish between new acts, which 
are grievable, and the continuing impact of older acts, which are 
not. 
In USS v. United Steelworkers of America Local 1219,16 the 
company began to offset an employee's paycheck on February 10, 
1996, deducting certain sickness and accident benefits the employee 
thought he was due. The grievance protesting these deductions was 
filed in May or June, in either event well after the contractually 
mandated thirty-day time limit for grieving. The arbitrator con­
cluded that the issuance of the first check applying the offset satis­
fied the requirement of company "action" and that the thirty-day 
clock had thus begun to run at that point. It was therefore too late 
to protest the first offset. The arbitrator, however, found that the 
grievant's failure to file within thirty days of that action in no way 
prohibited him from protesting other offsets: 
As the Company sees it, the initial offset was an "action" that demon­
strated the Company's interpretation of Section 10.41. Thus, Griev­
ant was required to protest that interpretation within 30 days of the 
first offset or be forever barred, at least for the initial period of 
disability. 
15. In Eaton County Road Commission v. AFSCME Council 25, 110 Lab. L. Rep. {BNA) 
(110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) 198 (1997) (Allen, Arb.), the arbitrator found that a notice to subcon­
tract "should not always" require the immediate filing of a grievance: "To require the Union 
to file a grievance, before any details are known, or before a Special Conference, could result 
in premature or needless grievances." 110 Lab. L. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 202. 
The arbitrator suggested in that case that the contents of the notice might determine whether 
time limits would be triggered at that point or whether, instead, each day of the subcontract­
ing would constitute an additional violation. 110 Lab. L. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) 
at 202. See also Selkirk Metalbestos v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 456, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 1147 (1997) (Amis, Arb.). There the arbitrator found the matter timely when the 
union, having received notice of management's intentions, waited for the actual subcontract­
ing to begin. Said the arbitrator: 
It is often the case that when management notifies the Union of its intentions for future 
action, as it did here in January 1996, the Union elects to wait until management acts to 
file a grievance. The Union thus has a concrete basis for its grievance rather than a 
speculative one. Indeed, where the Union grieves upon being given notice of manage­
ment's intent, the Company often will argue that the grievance is premature and that 
nothing has happened to justify it. 
107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1149. 
16. 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 434 (1997) (Bethel, Arb.). 
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... But it does not follow that the action of issuing one check with 
an offset precludes an employee from contesting subsequent offsets. 
After all, each check is an "action" of the Company denying benefits 
to the employee. Of course, the failure to grieve a particular offset 
within 30 days of that offset will preclude a remedy for that action. 
But Grievant is not barred from grieving subsequent offsets. In this 
case, then, Grievance 96-046 properly protested offsets made subse­
quent to its filing as well as those made within 30 days of the filing.17 
This is a textbook example of an arbitral response to the problem, 
including the standard - and, I argue here, potentially irrelevant 
- reliance on the "paycheck-as-violation" analysis. As will be 
noted, focusing solely on the existence of the check is not a suffi­
cient answer: How does one satisfactorily distinguish between 
checks that are, in fact, new actions from those that are merely 
manifestations of an earlier act? The following hypotheticals and 
cases suggest some guidelines. 
On January 1, management reviews a particular job, concluding 
it is properly paid at a Grade Level Five. The union believes it 
should be paid at Level Six, one grade higher. Thereafter, each 
paycheck is issued at the lower rate. Each time an employee re­
ceives a paycheck that is allegedly deficient, conventional wisdom 
suggests a grievance may be filed, as observed earlier. This ap­
proach is potentially problematic: May the employee perform the 
job for five years, only to claim that a misclassification occurred five 
years earlier? Such an outcome is unreasonable: If the job was, in 
fact, misranked, it ought to be grieved at the time, rather than hav­
ing both parties work under a system that is both inaccurate and 
capable of generating further problems in later years with subse­
quent job changes. 
17. 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. {BNA) at 438. But see Georgia Pac. Corp. v. ILWU Local 6, 110 
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) {110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) 269 (1998) (Oestreich, Arb.). In this case, the 
company implemented a new incentive pay plan. The union did not grieve implementation 
of the plan but waited for the date of the first paycheck, which was well beyond the applica­
ble filing time limits. The arbitrator concluded the filing was untimely. The union character­
ized the "occurrence of the event causing the grievance," 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (110 
Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 272, as the first issuance of paycheck, thereby raising the "classic" contin­
uing violation argument, 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 271. The arbitra­
tor, however, found the "occurrence" to be the implementation date of the new incentive 
plan, considerably earlier. 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 274. This 
arguably aberrant decision can be rationalized in one respect: the arbitrator placed substan­
tial emphasis on the wording of the grievance. 
To agree with the Union's contention would be inconsistent with the wording of the 
grievance filed by [the] Chief Steward . . . To hold otherwise would entirely change the 
nature of the grievance filed in this case. If the "event causing the grievance" took place 
on [the date of paycheck issuance], we would see a grievance filed on behalf of specific 
employees who received a lower gain share payout for the month of March under the 
new plan than they would have received under the old plan. 
110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 274 (emphasis added). 
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On January 1, a bargaining employee is notified her job is to be 
discontinued; her employment will be severed, effective immediately. 
Consistent with the collective bargaining agreement, she is entitled to 
a severance payment that is calculated in accordance with a contrac­
tually established formula involving her years of service. The em­
ployee is presented with a document that, in her judgment, misapplies 
the severance payment formula. The document requests that she elect 
whether to receive the payment in a lump sum or in the form of an 
annuity, payable monthly over twenty-five years. The employee opts 
for the annuity payment. Does this mean she now has twenty-five 
years to challenge, monthly, the application of the formula? In this 
case, the mere choice of payment form should not serve to modify 
the time limits applicable to the grievance. The grievant was ad­
vised, on January 1, of all the facts constituting grounds for the 
grievance. Had she received the payment in a lump sum on that 
date, no one would seriously argue that she could contest the calcu­
lation twenty or twenty-five years later. Merely modifying the pay­
out format should not have any impact.18 
On January 1, the results of a competitive promotion are an­
nounced. The grievant is not among those selected and, accordingly, 
he fails to qualify for a pay raise. Each paycheck thereafter repre­
sents a diminished amount, compared to what he would have re­
ceived with the promotion. But that does not provide license to file 
a grievance in perpetuity. The act complained of is the issuance of 
the promotion list, and notice to the grievant would presumably 
have been provided at the time the list was posted. Any other re-
18. In Allegheny Airlines v. ALPA, No. USX-96-087 {1997) (Bloch et al., Arbs.) (unpub­
lished decision on file with author), a pilot informed the company in October 1995 that he 
wished to retire, effective immediately. The company denied his request, claiming a lack of 
notice. It said, however, he could resign, and he did. At a later date, the pilot sought to 
claim his retirement benefits. The company denied him the free pass privileges that normally 
would be granted to retiring employees, citing a company regulation requiring pilots to go 
directly from active service to retirement. The interim resignation, the company claimed, 
should operate to deny his claim. The pilot grieved the lost pass privilege in March 1996, well 
beyond the sixty days contractually allowed for filing grievances. Conceding that the griev­
ance was filed beyond the sixty-day limit, the union maintained that the denial of the pass 
benefits was a continuing violation because the violation of the pilot's retirement benefits 
was ongoing. See Allegheny Airlines, No. USX-96-087, slip op. at 3. 
The System Board of Adjustment held that the matter was untimely filed: 
We do not conclude here that the company's actions in declining the grievant's at­
tempt to retire were necessarily proper. That question comprises the merits of this case. 
Our decision is limited to the finding that it was the company's actions on October 17, 
1995 that precipitated the current dispute. They should have been grieved within the 
negotiated 60-day period. . . . While the grievant suffered the loss of pass privileges 
because of [the company's October actions], there was no repeated act, standing prohibi­
tion . . .  or continuing actions by the company thereafter, only the effects of the original 
action. 
Allegheny Airlines, No. USX-96-087, slip op. at 7-8. 
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suit would be manifestly unfair to, among others, the successful job 
aspirant who may work in the classification for months or years, 
only to find a late-blooming claim that the promotion process was 
for naught. The promotion is a one-time, discrete act directed at an 
individual, as distinguished from, for example, the setting forth of 
general policies that will potentially apply to particular workers in 
limited instances. 
These hypothetical cases involve clearly defined acts - job clas­
sification, severance payment, and promotion - that affect salary, 
to be sure, but that are capable of being understood, reviewed, and 
challenged at the point they are announced. Other cases, however, 
are not as easily defined. 
THE "DOUBLE Acr" DILEMMA 
Perhaps the most difficult issue conceptually arises in the con­
text of management's unilaterally issuing a general policy or work 
rule. Parties and arbitrators often believe that, assuming the rule is 
somehow unfair - and therefore violative of the just cause require­
ment or otherwise contrary to an existing contractual requirement 
- its issuance creates a continuing violation situation. Thus, man­
agement's edict may be grieved any time it is applied; it is not nec­
essary to protest within a certain period following its issuance. 
On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to suggest, in the inter­
est of certainty and predictability in the industrial relationship, that 
management be aware, early on, that the policy it has attempted to 
promulgate is contractually offensive. Management may argue with 
some justification that, after years of application and with full con­
formance to its mandates, the policy should not suddenly be subject 
to challenge the first time the employee is disciplined for breaking 
its rule. On the other hand, there is merit in the standard rejoinder: 
the union should not have to speculate as to the nature of the disci­
pline or the impact of the rule. It is by no means unreasonable 
simply to await its application to test the integrity of the policy. 
These competing demands are accommodated by recalling that, 
with rare exception, one premises a finding of timeliness on the 
existence of an act that, while possibly repetitive, is nevertheless 
new. This means that, in this context, there may be two or more 
viable events constituting acts - issuing the policy and enforcing 
it.19 
19. In Dyncorp Wallops Flight Facility v. International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers District 74, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1033 (1993) (Jones, Arb.), the company de­
clined to discharge an employee who was failing to retain his membership in good standing 
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On January 1, management issues a new set of work rules requir­
ing, among other things, that employees be "clean shaven- no mus­
taches or beards. '120 Two employees are affected by the new rules: 
the first has grown a beard and has been threatened with suspension 
until he shaves it off. The second has requested permission to grow a 
beard but has been denied and told he will be disciplined if he does. 
On February 15, the first employee files a grievance contending 
the policy is unreasonable, unnecessarily infringing the personal pre­
rogatives of otherwise well-groomed employees who either would 
like to grow a beard or mustache or keep the one they have. Man­
agement objects on the basis of timeliness, citing a ten-day limit.21 
The grievant is told he is too late: he, or the union, should have 
challenged the rule within ten days of its issuance. Having failed to 
do so, the rule must be assumed reasonable and his grievance 
nonarbitrable. 
An arbitrator would likely make short work of the company's 
protest in this case. Even if it were too late to challenge the under­
lying rule, the issue of reasonableness may properly be tested as 
applied to a disciplinary situation. This is a situation in which an 
existing policy may not be challenged, but the discipline may. 
To be sure, the end result of challenging the disciplinary event, 
as contrasted to the policy underlying it, may be the same. If the 
policy is found wanting in circumstances that are broadly applicable 
to the workforce, the result of setting aside one employee's disci­
pline will be indistinguishable from setting aside the policy. But 
this does not change the underlying rationale: To take another ave­
nue to contest a particular policy is wholly consistent with the prem­
ise that by disciplining, management had engaged in a new act. The 
with the union. The arbitrator noted that if, in fact, the labor agreement required the com­
pany to discharge the employee when requested by the union, "then every day (or month) 
that the Company continues to allow [the employee] to work without rendering to the Union 
the required minimum service fees, another occurrence of the aggrieved issue takes place." 
101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1036. Here, too, the violation - failing to honor the union 
security agreement - was being repeated from day to day, albeit as a result of the em­
ployer's inaction rather than action. 
20. For some reason, the "hair cases" no longer play as visible a role as they did in the 
1960s and 1970s. Perhaps this is a fashion statement. Or perhaps it is simply because this is 
the 1990s. 
21. Conceivably, management may also claim the grievance is not ripe and therefore not 
properly before the arbitrator inasmuch as there has been no discipline meted out for a 
breach of the regulation. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Brotherhood of R.R., Airline and 
Steamship Clerks, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 31 (1977) (Bloch et al., Arbs.). As to that issue, 
the arbitrator concluded that it was not necessary for an employee actually to subject himself 
to discipline in order to test the reasonableness of the rule. 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 33. 
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challenged act in this case is the enforcement of the rule; that event 
provides the new set of time limits. 
The second employee, wishing to grow a beard, also challenges 
the rule on February 15. Here, too, management raises a timeliness 
objection, contending, once more, that a grievance challenging the 
rule should have been registered within the contractual time limits 
following issuance of the policy. 
There are compelling practical reasons to conclude that, 
notwithstanding the need for certainty in the administration and ap­
plication of work rules, one should not require an immediate chal­
lenge to the issuance of general work rules. A new absenteeism 
program, for example - particularly the so-called no-fault pro­
grams22 - may incorporate a variety of arcane mechanisms for 
counting absences. Assuming, as is often the case, that the program 
has not been negotiated with the union, but rather imposed as an 
exercise of managerial authority, the union cannot be expected to 
have reviewed or discovered each and every potential application 
and to have tested it against any existing just-cause requirement. 
The union is likely to determine that it makes more sense to test the 
rule as applied. Beyond that, it is true that, from the employees' 
standpoint, nothing has happened: it is management's action in dis­
ciplining or, alternatively, in declining permission to engage in a 
certain activity,23 that triggers the time limits as applied to an in­
dependent event. 
Does this mean an established policy is forever subject to chal­
lenge? Do time limits simply not apply to implementation of a pol­
icy? Is the policy vulnerable to being overturned, without 
limitation at any time? How does one distinguish between events 
that, when repeated, constitute a series of new acts, on the one 
hand, and those events that are merely evidence of continuing im­
pact, on the other?24 The answer is: It depends on the specific na­
ture of the employer policy or plan. One must pay careful attention 
22. As distinguished from programs where management scrutinizes each proffered reason 
for absence, some employers opt to assume all absences valid, but to charge points in every 
instance. Discipline or dismissal follows upon attaining a certain point level. 
23. One might properly inquire whether it is always necessary for an employee to incur 
discipline for the purpose of testing a rule. Practically speaking, one should not demand that 
sort of "test case." The continuing nature of the labor relationship strongly suggests that the 
parties should be able to submit jointly such a question for resolution or that, at the least, the 
parties should be able to test the issue by means of a formal request for permission that, 
when denied, would be grieved. See Northwest Airlines, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. {BNA). 
24. Finding that a grievance is timely, as in the case of a protest to discipline administered 
under a long-standing policy, is not a guarantee that the policy will be overturned. Evidence 
may well persuade the arbitrator that the policy has been mutually accepted in practice or by 
acquiescence. 
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to the nature of the act. When management issues a general policy 
or work rule, not yet fleshed out through application, it is reason­
able to consider the possibility of testing the policy "on its face" at 
the time it is issued or, alternatively, to await its actual application 
to test it "as applied." An attendance policy, for example, may 
have wide applications in a variety of circumstances. A union 
should not have to review, for possible challenge, every imaginable 
variation and application at the time of issuance. But when the new 
policy, pronouncement, or plan is directed to a discrete' event -
changing an existing pay plan, for example - management has a 
strong argument that the act or event is then definable, complete, 
and reviewable and that it must, therefore, be grieved at that point. 
The argument that subsequent paychecks will have been improp­
erly modified will, in such case, be unavailing, for those payments 
will be properly regarded as the impact of the act, rather than the 
act itself. Consider, in that context, the following cases. 
In late 1992, the employer, a wastewater treatment facility, an­
nounced a reorganization plan, part of which required that two 
Treatment Plant Foreman positions be reclassified as Operators, 
lower-rated jobs. The effective date of that reclassification was 
February 1, 1993. Some fifteen months later, in May 1994, the 
union concluded that the job to which the grievants had been trans­
ferred was improperly classified. It requested that the employer 
make the appropriate modifications, but this was denied. Accord-
In Larry's Markets v. UFCW Local 1105, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 795 (1995) 
(Lehleitner, Arb.), the employer issued a commitment to the neighborhood co=unity that 
employees would be prohibited from parking on residential streets. The employer posted the 
restriction on August 4, 1994. The grievance protesting the restriction was not filed until six 
months later, well beyond the applicable 60-day limitation for filing grievances. 105 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 798-99. The arbitrator found a continuing violation, concluding inter 
alia, that "each day that employees are prohibited from parking on City streets, a new, al­
leged violation occurs. Stated differently, the facts of this case represent a classic example of 
a continuing violation, which is not subject to time limits." 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 799. 
This case well reflects the double act syndrome. The act at issue is the existing prohibi­
tion on parking. From a purely conceptual standpoint, the prohibition is issued anew each 
day: Were an employee to request permission to park, it would be denied. That denial could 
be grieved. Yet delay is not necessarily cost-free. That is, a grievant could challenge the cost, 
for example, of alternative parking on a given date - and thereby challenge the prospective 
vitality of the rule - but likely would be proscribed from seeking retroactive compensation. 
Moreover, it is entirely possible an arbitrator would entertain the grievance as timely, but 
conclude that, inasmuch as the policy bad been in existence for an extended time, free from 
challenge and actually in effect - employees had, in fact, stopped parking in the neighbor­
hood - the union must be seen as having acquiesced in the policy. 
Such a finding may require evidence as to the particular rule and the nature of its applica­
tion. If, for example, the rule has existed but has been essentially dormant, never having 
been applied and, therefore, never having been tested, one may conclude there is no reason 
to find acquiescence or acceptance by the union. If, on the other hand, the rule has been 
routinely enforced, an arbitrator may well find that the union's silence has amounted to ac­
quiescence and that, having effectively slept on its rights, it is too late to challenge. -
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ingly, the union grieved in June 1994. The arbitrator concluded 
that, as concerns the original reclassification, the matter was un­
timely. The union had sufficient knowledge of all relevant facts in 
1993 and should have grieved within the applicable ten calendar 
days. He found that the later grievance, however, was timely be­
cause the misclassification, if any, was a continuing violation.25 Said 
the arbitrator: 
the grievance can be characterized as "continuing" in the sense that 
each day there is a separate occurrence of the act complained of, as 
opposed to a single completed event or transaction. In these types of 
grievances, arbitrators have not strictly enforced grievance time lim­
its, although any remedy awarded typically runs only from the filing 
of the grievance.26 
The reclassification case is an example where management's ac­
tion is clear, well-defined, and, significantly, fully executed upon its 
completion. The judgment has been made; there is nothing else to 
accomplish. This is not an inchoate act or response awaiting appro­
priate circumstances for its application. In this case, if a grievance 
protesting the original reclassification is in fact untimely, it makes 
little sense to conclude that the same claim should later be consid­
ered timely. Surely, this is a situation involving the continuing im­
pact of the initial management decision. To the extent the 
arbitrator's decision ignores that fact, it is in error.27 
In Titan Wheel International v. International Assn. of Machinists 
& Aerospace Workers Local 2048,28 the union contended that the 
company violated the labor agreement by failing to pay certain clas­
sified jobs incentive rates rather than standard hourly rates of pay. 
The company argued, among other things, that the union had been 
aware of the company's position for some five years and that it had 
filed several grievances and withdrawn them. Therefore, the arbi­
trator should consider the matter untimely. The arbitrator found 
the grievance was of "the continuing type" 
in that there is the basis for a grievance each time the employee re­
ceives a paycheck. If the positions are not properly classified under 
the terms and conditions of the Agreement, then the Company's fail-
25. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 367, 108 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) 97 (1997) (Landau, Arb.). 
26. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 99. 
27. Nor is it accurate to state that arbitrators somehow apply time limits loosely in the 
case of a continuing violation. If, in fact, there has been a recurrent breach, the time limits 
apply with complete precision because a new triggering date has been established. 
28. 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 514 {1991) (Smith, Arb.). 
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ure to properly remunerate. the employee is basis for a grievance as 
long as the violation continues.29 
Yet if one assumes the company's position as to incentive rates was 
clearly announced at the time of its imposition, it is unclear why the 
arbitrator should not require a timely challenge at that point. Here, 
as in a promotion case, the management action is clearly defined, 
identifiable, and complete. It affects pay, to be sure. But the pros­
pect of continuing paychecks neither changes the requirement of a 
timely protest nor salvages an otherwise untimely claim. Once the 
time limits have expired, the paychecks are merely the continuing 
impact of the uncontested act.3o 
In Great Falls Public Schools v. International Union of Operat­
ing Engineers Local 400,31 two bargaining-unit employees worked 
on Memorial Day, 1996. They received holiday pay at the rate of 
double the regular hourly rate. The union maintained the employ­
ees were entitled to triple time. The parties discussed the issue then 
and, indeed, in subsequent contract negotiations thereafter. Ulti­
mately, however, they were unable to agree, and the union grieved 
the matter on October 11. The parties had established a five-day 
limit for filing grievances.32 The arbitrator found the matter arbi­
trable. First, he concluded, this was a "union grievance filed on be­
half of all the bargaining unit members in an attempt to have its 
29. 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 519. 
30. In Excel Corp. v. UFCW District 540, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1144 (1977) (Moore, 
Arb.), the union grieved the fact that employees in a particular department were being de­
nied the opportunity to be paid "gang time" - pay based on work assigned to a particular 
department rather than based on the time the employee clocks in and out. 
Tue union claimed the failure to pay on the "gang time" system was a violation of the 
contract and that each paycheck represented a "continuing violation." Management argued 
that the pay system bad been implemented some ten years before and had survived scrutiny 
in intervening contract negotiations. It claimed, therefore, that the grievance was untimely. 
108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1146. Tue arbitrator concluded that, inasmuch as the manner 
of payment to the grievants had been established ten years ago and that the union had had 
the opportunity to address the matter during negotiations, it was untimely. 108 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) at 1146-47. 
Issues of notice frequently arise in such cases. Most often, work rules and employment­
related policies, as distinguished from actual contract revisions, are unilaterally promulgated 
instead of bargained. There may well be a question of whether the union was properly ap­
prised of the new policy for purposes of ascertaining the triggering moment of the time limits. 
In this case, then, it is conceivable that the first pay period might represent such notice, 
assuming inadequate notice prior to that time. Given the significance of the time limits, 
factual questions of notice are scrutinized carefully. 
31. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 998 (1997) (Calhoun, Arb.). 
32. Art. XX sec. 20.1.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement provided that "[i]f the 
matter is not resolved under the preceding provision or if the immediate supervisor fails to 
give his answer within the time provided, the aggrieved employee and his representative if 
desired shall have five (5) working days to reduce the grievance to writing and present same 
to the District." 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 999. 
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interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement upheld. "33 
"Union grievances," he opined, "are by nature continuing."34 He 
also concluded the matter had been filed "in anticipation of what 
the unioJ!. had every reason to believe would be a contract violation 
as soon as a bargaining unit employee worked a holiday."35 There 
is no support for his first conclusion that union grievances are 
somehow exempt from time limits. The second rationale reflects 
another, more common, misunderstanding.36 
If, as is apparently the case, the union was protesting solely the 
employer's interpretation of the Holiday Pay provision - first 
made apparent on Memorial Day, 1996- the grievance protesting 
that interpretation should be considered untimely. Save for the fact 
that the Holiday Pay itself was not a consistent paycheck element, 
this case is indistinguishable from those in which the management 
action was, in fact, fully executed. The payments, then, were the 
manifestations of the changed policy and did not give rise to the 
type of new event that would generate new time limits. 
SUMMARY 
Clear and consistent application of time limits benefits all par­
ticipants in the collective bargaining relationship. Stale claims are 
avoided, there is less chance of festering problems, and as a general 
matter, the parties operate with a more current, more precise con­
cept of the bargain they have negotiated. The search for "continu­
ing violations" must focus on the existence of new and independent 
actions that may be claimed as contract violations without regard to 
any nexus to past events. In particular, parties must avoid the urge 
to treat altered wage payments as a sine qua non for timeliness. 
Such events may, indeed, be new, albeit repeated, violations. But 
they may also represent nothing more than the impact of a clearly 
defined management action that, assuming proper notice and dis­
closure, should have been challenged at its inception. Recognizing 
these concepts will serve to avoid the conceptual pitfalls and defini­
tional uncertainties that often attend these issues. 
33. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1001. 
34. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1001. 
35. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1001. Unaccountably, he also concluded that the griev­
ance was not a request for an advisory opinion. 
36. Inasmuch as the grievance was denied, it is unclear whether the arbitrator considered 
the grievances of the two bargaining-unit employees arbitrable or whether, instead, he was 
focusing solely on the timeliness issues surrounding "union grievance." For purposes of this 
discussion, however, one may assume he would have found the five-month-old event outside 
the scope of the time limits. 
